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I. INTRODUCTION
The Importance of Understanding Change
That technology can drastically alter the nature of society is not
news. Much of our most important social and economic history is a chron-
icle of the adjustments which nations and peoples have made to new tech-
nology. Today, awareness of the impact of technology on the environment
is coupled with a strong and widely-held determination to reap the bene-
fits of technological advance while preserving the environment.
Destruction of desirable environmental qualities is the archtype of
second-order effects—the unwanted and unlooked-for by-products of some
program or activity undertaken to produce other desirable results. It
has been striking that in the adoption of new technologies, the unlooked-
for consequences have sometimes been as important as those specifically
sought.
The new view is that it is not really necessary for society to be
the unwitting foil for new technologies—provided that society can develop
the requisite means for analysis and direction of technological change.
The classic pattern, documented in the history of the industrial revolution
and elsewhere, is that entrepreneurs had enormous freedom to invent and
The author would like particularly to acknowledge the helpful
comments of Dean Louis H. Mayo and Vary T. Coates, and of Henry E. Brady,
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adopt new technology where they found it profitable to do so.
Toddy, through technology assessment, means are being sought to
predict, evaluate and direct the path of technological change in
such a way as to preserve the public interest. Presently mechanisms
for these purposes are anemic but they are not entirely lacking.
This new emphasis is in an old tradition, broadened to meet modern
needs. There were often occasions in the past where untoward effects
of technology could be anticipated by persons in a position to exer-
cise some control. A classic illustration is the doctrine of riparian
rights which became important with the emergence of water power as a
basis for industry, particularly in New England. The effect of an
upstream dam on downstream users of water was direct, obvious and
easily anticipated. Here, at least, legal sanctions did protect the
downstream users from the impact of a new technology (the upstream dam
and industrial plant run by water wheels) through the normal processes
of law. But the downstream users were a small portion of those who
were affected by the development of water power-based industry. The
concept of riparian rights did nothing about poor working conditions
and squalid living conditions. In short, control over second-order
consequences, which is the heart of the technology assessment idea, was
partial but far from complete.
Throughout history new technology has given rise to problems com-
parable to those which concern us today. There is reason to believe that
the unexpected consequences of today's scientific research may be even
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more significant and occasionally more devastating than that of the 18th
and 19th centuries. Because the results of science are always new, fre-
quently the knowledge necessary for anticipating effects is not available.
The National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 is the latest manifes-
tation of the philosophy that it is the responsibility of governmental
agencies to supply solid information, based on sound analyses of certain
second-order impacts of its programs, and of the activities of sectors
of the economy to which it is related. The Act imposes new obligations
on every program and agency to perform.an assessment of new technologies
which it intends to implement as part of its process of planning and
implementation. Legally, agencies cannot proceed with their programs
until satisfactory studies have been performed. And these studies will
require a level of effort and data which considerably exceeds that
which is now available.
The Scope of Technology Assessment
Technology assessment, in its present state,is essentially a
rallying cry for an extremely mixed group who are convinced of its
need and potential. Technology assessment is apparently on its way
to becoming a cross-disciplinary, problem-oriented and generalist type
of expertise. The process of arriving at a commonly agreed-upon defini-
tion is tantamount to a process of agreeing on scope, method, and the
future development of technology assessment.
It is important that technology assessment not be restricted to
evaluating new results of science and engineering. Because the word
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"technology" is often thought of narrowly, there is a tendency to con-
ceive of technology simply as a synonym for science, scientific
research, development and engineering. Those who use the word "tech-
nology" in this way tend to think of technology assessment as wholly
concerned with the impact of science and engineering and the imple-
mentation of new techniques recently emerging from research and
development. But technology assessment should be concerned with
evaluating the full range of techniques that are relevant to a parti-
cular decision or change. Changes in social and political institutions
should not be excluded.' This is a broader definition than is usually
advanced, and is based on the thought that technology is essentially the
technique by which society accomplishes its goals. Thus technology
assessment is concerned with the total direct and indirect consequences
of the choice of technique, and particularly of changes in technique.
Narrower definitions are generally colored by a strong reaction to the
role that science and engineering play in changing society. They tend
to focus on what their advocates consider to be the most important or
strategic areas for assessment of change in technique.
Actually, the popular identification of technology with science, develop-
ment and engineering is not a universal usage. Technology properly means the
technique by which.something is done rather than the process of introducing
new technological possiblities or changing technique. To say that
the technology of an advanced industrial country differs from the
technology of an emerging country is merely to say that the techniques
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by which people are housed, fed, clothed, transported, etc. differ.
It is because this meaning is not widely adopted that there is so
much confusion as to the meaning of technology assessment; the con-
fusion is over the word "technology" rather than assessment.
One of the more complete statements of the meaning and impact of
technology was made by Jacques Ellul. In the language of his translator,
"The term technique, as I use it, does not mean machines,
technology, or this or that procedure for attaining an
end. In our technological society, technique is the
totality of methods rationally arrived at and having
absolute efficiency (for a given stage of development)
in every field of human activity."2
Applied psychology and sociology are techniques of sport. If we recognize
that the method each person employs to attain a result is, in fact, his
particular technique, the problem of means is raised. In fact, technique
is nothing more than means and the ensemble of means. It would be more
consistent with Ellul's usage to speak of technique assessment, rather
than technology assessment. What he means by "la technique" is at least
as broad as the usual meaning of technology.
Given popular usage, the word technology seems to be necessary,
since—at least in America—"technique" conveys too narrow a meaning.
However, the word technology suggests a preoccupation with changes in tech-
nique adopted because science and engineering have made new techniques
available; the strategic idea behind this orientation is that these
are the changes in technique that it is most important to study. But
it would be difficult to argue that changes in social institutions are,
today, any less important. These need the same assessment as do the
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results of research and development. Further the methods and expertise
are much the same for changes from any source, and all types of societal
change are very much interwoven. The processes of research and engineering
are often as likely to be initiated in response to social change as the
other way around (e.g. home appliances by the disappearance of a domestic
servant class.) While focusing on the impact of R&D may be sound strategy,
it is a clarification to distinguish between assessing the impact of society's
choice of technique and the problem of selecting priorities for groups
engaged in technology.
It is change itself rather than the cause of changes which creates
problems for society. What should concern society is not broadened
awareness of alternatives, but the process by which alternatives are
selected. While science and engineering, by making available superior
techniques, accelerate change, society undergoes changes even in the
absence of new techniques. Political, social and economic forces result
in switches from one set of techniques to another, frequently with pro-
found consequences; these changes too need assessment.
It is transparently clear that the important second-order conse-
quences of technology in the broad sense are often social and economic
impacts. While much of technology assessment is hard science, the
orientation for such analysis and the assessment of consequences of
physical effects of technology are the province of the social sciences.
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Technology Assessment as Analysis
Technology assessment is analysis, and its methods are essentially
the analytical methods of natural sciences, social sciences, juris-
prudence, etc.
While technology assessment is frequently the analysis of actual or
proposed change, it can also be analysis of a lack of change where change
is possible. It reflects a new pragmatism in which second-order conse-
quences that an earlier generation would tend to ignore are seen to be
of considerable importance. It is unique in that it not merely focuses
on identified second-order consequences but displays an uneasy awareness
that unidentified consequences may also be important. It displays a
similarly uneasy awareness of the enormously diffuse and interwoven
patterns of effects—known and unknown—that may result from the choice
of technology. The current usage of the word "environment" to include
the whole array of effects on plants, animals, the atmosphere and waters,
and all aspects of human existence is a useful catch-word. In this
context, technology assessment can be said to be concerned primarily
with environmental impacts of technology, while it would be misleading
if "environment" were narrowly defined.
The pragmatism behind the technology assessment idea reflects the
belief that society has the means for implementing its deliberate choice
of technology, so that assessment is not merely an idle exercise. Inevi-
tably those concerned with technology assessment focus strongly op the
processes of government by which society implements its choices. In
practice, this often amounts to the planning of governmental programs,
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the evaluation of proposed new programs and of on-going programs. Much
of the strategy of technology assessment groups has therefore focused on
providing the Congress, the Executive Office of the President, and their
equivalents in state and local governments with the means to put first-
and second-order consequences in perspective.
The justification for technology assessment is that it brings with-
in the decision framework the consequences of the use and choice of
techniques whose impacts tend to be overlooked by organizations whose
interests are focused elsewhere. First-order consequences, the objective
of the agency and its mission, will generally have been studied, evaluated
and selected primarily for their effectiveness in accomplishing the
assigned missions. Second-order consequences can assist in program
justification, or may be the basis for objections to programs. For
example, reduction in welfare costs would be a definite consideration in
a manpower training program, although conceptually it would be an
indirect, second-order consequence.
Although the methods of technology assessment are those of known
and established areas of analytical expertise, it seeks to apply them
in an integrated manner to extremely unpliable material. Its special
difficulties are the result of its subject area. It is difficult to be
succinct as to the processes of analysis. Every discipline has its
own methods, the combined result of its intellectual traditions, the
skills in which its members are trained, the characteristics of its
subject area, and of the information that it works with. Particularly
among the disciplines that have been infused by the methods of science,
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there are strong similarities in methodology. The extent to which a
particular discipline uses these methods is evolutionary, and only in
recent decades has there been much application of the methods of science
in disciplines strongly oriented toward other analytical traditions,
such as history, law, etc. Those disciplines which have a methodology
for prediction or analysis of the hypothetical are especially adapted
to technology assessment.
However, a few points stand out with respect to the structure and
elements of a technology assessment exercise. First, technology assess-
ment is predictive, since it is directed at the consequences of the
choice of method at a time when the events lie in the future, or are
still hypothetical. Second, technology assessment focuses on the
obscure—the second-order effects of changes in methods that result
from little understood or wholly unsuspected linkages between cause and
effect.
Third, technology assessment is typically undertaken at a time
when the principal direct or first-order effects of programs are them-
selves imperfectly understood. It is reasonable to ask, when the planned
sought^for results of programs so often fail to materialize as expected,
if there is much hope of predictive success with respect to unexpected
effects. Early in the development of programs the specific policy
actions or choice of methods is an open question subject to a wide
range of choice,and highly significant differences in second- and
higher-order consequences may be involved.
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Fourth, technology assessment is generally undertaken without clear
statements of program objectives or criteria for evaluation. There are
frequently no well-defined policies with respect to many of the second-
order consequences on which a technology assessment might legitimately
focus. Ambiguity of criteria and objectives with respect to second-
order effects, or a reasonable set of value judgments, is very common.
Fifth, one of the principal problems of technology assessment is
that analysis may necessarily be formulated in ways that would require
non-existent information as to causal relationships. Often relation-
ships that have never been thought important have never been studied at
all—and even relationships which have been studied intensively are often
imperfectly understood.
Sixth, and related to the previous point, even where relationships
are known, the process of calibrating them frequently requires non-existent
data. Some of the data will be social indicators, and for them it will
often be necessary first to determine how reasonably accurate, meaningful
social indicators can be devised. Precise definitions, the starting
point for meaningful data collection, are often lacking. Characteristi-
cally, the statistics-gathering establishments have not sought data
that have not been considered important, and they have not caught up
with the new demands created by the interest in technology assessment.
Technology assessment has been, up to now, generally undertaken with
very limited resources and under time pressure which makes it difficult
to grapple adequately with the analytical problem.
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None of these attributes are unique to technology. In total, they
amount to precisely the array of obstacles that generally leads an analyst
whose training lies in some established discipline to move on to some
other problem. Recently, Paul Samuelson referred to a maxim of his fellow
Nobel prize winner, biologist Peter Medawar, that science must deal with
o
that which can be managed, eschewing the intractable. By these terms
of reference, technology assessment is not a subject for scientific
effort, and it is hardly well-chosen by the discipline-oriented scientist
seeking solid professional accomplishment by applying the accepted methods
of his discipline. Technology assessment is precisely the kind of pro-
blem which graduate students sometimes suggest for their Ph.D. disser-
tations, and which responsible faculties steer them away from.
The justification for technology assessment is not its tractability
but the importance of providing the body politic with means for under-
standing the whole implications of changes of method. The body politic
is not obliged to ask simple questions or questions for which established
disciplines operate efficiently.
If the members of every discipline decline to operate on problems
for which their skills are not adapted, there will remain a significant
array of modern-world problems which no discipline will accept. Among
them will be many of the problems with which technology assessment is
concerned. Technology assessment is problem orLented in the sense that
it seeks answers to problems arising from change of method according to
the importance to society without regard to the state of the analytical
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machinery. Inevitably, technology assessment focuses on some intractable
problem areas—and indeed, the tendency of the scientists to seek out
problems tractable to their disciplines means that the crucial unanswered
questions on which technology assessment focuses tend to be cross-
disciplinary and intractable.
All disciplines are problem oriented in their own terms and it
would be a gross misrepresentation to suggest that the sciences are not
problem oriented either in their historical development or present-day
practice. From the public policy standpoint the difficulty lies in
the selectivity criteria which scientists typically apply to problem
selection. A scientist cannot build a reputation by dealing with
tractable but unimportant problems. Reputation building is based on
identifying important problems where success is within reach. Clearly,
many such problems are important. The science policy machinery of the
U.S. is especially efficient in calling the attention of the scientific
community to important problem areas that lie within disciplinary areas.
Conventions, committees, panels selectively making federal funds avail-
able are part of this mechanism.
Consider the relevance of the above observations to introductory
remarks on the technology of teaching aids, by the National Academy of
Engineering's Committee on Public Policy:
...a complete assessment of the technology of teaching aids
would be concerned with the consequences of the interaction
of technology with all educational institutions and methods.
An assessment of such scope was considered to be too
broad for this study. Since the principal backgrounds of
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the Task Force members were in the field of higher education,
it was decided to limit the assessment effort to the impacts
of technology on the institutions of higher education in the
United States.4
As this effort purported to be an experimental technology assess-
ment, the quotation draws attention to the difficulties of performing
technology assessments using persons drawn from various disciplines ,
with habits of thought, roots and perhaps future aspirations related
to those disciplines.
In short, technology assessment as an analytical effort is the
superimposition on the old of a new focus and a new orientation. It
would be a mistake to consider it merely a new name for old analy-
tical procedures, but there will be little in it that is wholly unfami-
liar to persons trained in one kind or another of discipline-bound
analysis.
Nonetheless, the adjustments which must be made in problem selection,
orientation, and cross-disciplinary flows of analytical inputs and data
would appear enough to make it likely that a wholly new disciplinary
tradition will emerge as the volume of technology assessment activity
increases. It Is likely, ultimately, to emerge as a discipline in its
own right. It is clear from the history of science that new methodologies
can emerge from what previously had been intractable problems, that
Increasing the level of effort accelerates the development of the
requisite methodology, even if the process is slow and uncertain.
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II. STATUS OF THE ELEMENTS OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT
Prediction
/
Because technology assessment is future-oriented analysis, any
analytical method with the capability of relating past and present
conditions to the future may be useful. Prediction is, of course, an
ancient art and, especially in the soft sciences, heuristic methods
are traditional and sometimes all that are available. But they need
not be unsystematic, as has been shown forcefully by the emergence
of procedures such as RAND's Delphi.
Increasingly, the forecasting of technological change has made
use of analytical methods and results—though it would be going too
far to call technological forecasting a wholly analytical process.
The variety of intuition-analytical mixes which prevails is consider-
able. Whatever the area, the most credible predictive methods are
based on structural models which relate time-lagged dependent vari-
ables to independent variables for which data can be obtained. Demo-
graphy and weather forecasting are examples of predictive sciences on
a solid theoretical foundation.
While there is often widespread faith in the meaningfulness of
predictions, their validityvis rarely examined with any rigor. The
faith may be largely misplaced. Of all disciplines, economics has
been more explicitly concerned with prediction than most. Previews
of economic forecasts of Gross National Product, mostly by trained
economists using well-developed theories and structural models,
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indicate that success of the more elaborate formulations is quite limited
compared with such procedures as extrapolations of trends.
The Obscurity of Consequences
The obscurity of the linkages between sought-after results of choice
of method and second-order consequences results in part from lack of
adequate structural models, and in turn is attributable to the general
disinclination of scholars to create models until they serve some
purpose. Not until concern for second-order consequences becomes
general will motivations to create satisfactory models become strong in
a pragmatic society.
Unfortunately, as models are expanded to deal explicitly with more
and more second-order consequences, they become larger, more complex,
and unless deliberately limited, they would ultimately encompass every
aspect of every element of society.
Studies of second-order effects are almost inevitably system-like
in characteristics. Where the focus of analysis broadens, the system-
like structure of problem areas—and therefore of analytical methods—
tends to affect the nature of analysis and the management of analysis.
The high similarity of analytical needs where system-like problems are
of interest has been widely noted, and has generated a relatively new
body of literature—e.g. general systems theory.
But the art of model-building traditionally is one of simplifi-
cation, of hewing to the line of fundamental relationships, and specifi-
cally setting aside second-order effects. Especially in the social
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sciences, the successful model generally relates only the principal
part of the variations in dependent variables and leaves exploration
of discrepancies between model-predicted and actual values of depen-
dent variables to informed interpretation. Thus, the obscurity of
second-order consequences tends to be built into existing methodology.
While the problems of obscurity are serious, it is reasonable to
believe that they can be reduced by differently orienting model-
building.
Identifying consequences in explicit physical terms will rarely
serve the purposes of technology assessment. The final link, between
the physical and the public welfare implications must also be made.
Welfare economics provides the most highly developed methodology which
seeks to relate consequences in physical terms to "utility" or welfare,
and this methodology is important in technology assessment both because
economic consequences are important and because it is a paradigm for
other disciplines. However, welfare economics is not the only approach
to analysis of consequences, and the analysis of consequences in a
framework narrowly oriented to the methodology of welfare economics is
Q
neither necessary nor desirable.
Uncertainty as to the Policies to be Analyzed
For a technology assessment to proceed systematically, the analysis
to serve the purposes of technology assessment must be of alternative
policies that have been spelled out with reasonable explicitness. If
such information is not available in the early stages of policy, the
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only practical solution may be creativity on the part of a technology
assessment group—the articulation of a spectrum of policies considered
to approximate what is likely to be considered seriously by the policy
makers. Such exercises require a full appreciation of organizational
goals, methods, and environment, including an intimate knowledge of
the organization to which the policies pertain.
To retain the objectivity necessary for valid analysis, a tech-
nology assessment group must develop the prototype policies needed for
analysis without acquiring an emotional or intellectual commitment to
its own creations. This is so contrary to human nature that some
separation of function may be essential. There is also, potentially,
another dilemma. The'effort of defining and selecting policies is,
for any agency, a major effort. The existence of a useful expertise
in a technology assessment group may result in participation in agency
policy formulation in ways that may bias the technology assessment
function.
Lack of Clear Statements of Objectives or Criteria
In many organizations statements of objectives are considered to
be window dressing, without direct operational or planning significance,
Yet the dominant theory of planning insists on starting .with a state-
ment of objectives framed so that it is possible to relate them expli-
citly to program content.
Statements of objectives have an operational meaning only when
they reflect the guiding principles of organizational leadership and
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it is often difficult to persuade leaders to expose their own value
judgments, and to generate statements of objectives to which they feel
any deep-felt sense of commitment. Even where they try, the statements
often have deficiencies—objectives which are better left unsaid are
omitted. Agency heads frequently cannot, in short simple exercises,
articulate sets of objectives in terms of which future agency actions
are comprehensible. Much of the art of political analysis amounts to
deducing from actions what the objectives of political leaders are, in
contrast to what they are claimed to be. Deliberate deception is not
necessarily involved—leaders as well as others simply do not know their
own mind until put to the test. Planning can be disoriented by incom-
plete or inapplicable statements of objectives, and technology assess-
ment is likely to suffer in the same way.
Technology assessment would benefit from the emergence of a theory
of planning which would direct efficient goal-seeking behavior without
a statement of objectives. Lacking this, a technology assessment group
has no alternative but to assume agency objectives on the best available
evidence.
Beyond this, the broad social orientation of technology assessment
requires statements of objectives for society as a whole. It means
assumptions as to the value judgments of society, and somehow integrating
a broad range of differing and perhaps conflicting objectives and value
j udgments.
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Unknown Functional Relationships
The long run strategy for technology assessment must be to identify
important unknown functional relationships and persuade government to
fund, and scholars to perform, studies that will define and then refine
knowledge of them. This suggests on the one hand a broadening and
deepening of the processes of much scientific research. It further
suggests that one of the outputs of technology assessment must be explicit
guidance to scholarly communities of what studies can ultimately contri-
bute to the technology assessment process.
Before this process can start, however, the existence of functional
relationships must be at least suspected by persons or groups with the
ability to carry their ideas forward. There is, to be sure, an enormous
need for making precise partially known relationships. Perhaps there
needs to be as much concern over those that have not reached the level
of awareness; certainly, if technology assessment is ultimately to meet
society's needs, it must include a search for obscure relationships.
Often analysis is manageable once the question is posed, but who is to
pose the question?
Non-Existent Data
As with functional relationships, technology assessment must identify
needed data and persuade funders and scholars of its importance; this
is also a long-run approach. The kinds of data needed will often differ
materially from that now collected. Some kinds will involve substantial
conceptual thinking. As already noted, social indicators are often
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relevant to the data problems of technology assessment, and indeed some
problems are merely the non-availability of appropriate social indicators.
An example is an indicator of "quality of life." The various dodges >
suggested for indicators of such characteristics, including surrogates,
o
will often be helpful. An important consideration is constructing
models in terms of available data, where models in these terms can be
satisfactory for the purposes of technology assessment.
For reasons of lack of data, the models constructed immediately
may be compromises with structural reality. The unease with such com-
promises—whatever their predictive success—is a strong motivation to
create new data series which are appropriate to structurally valid models.
Will technology assessment be stymied by lack of data? Perhaps
often so. Yet productive analyses'by informed men have often overcome
data problems, and indeed the early history of many sciences tells of
the emergence of theories with long-standing validity at a time when
data were crude or non-existent. It also saw the emergence of many
wrong ideas. Technology assessment has the option, where data are
not obtainable in the requisite time frame, of performing no analysis
or taking the risk.
It seems also to be true that many technology assessments have
failed to take advantage of reasonable opportunities to generate new
data. Technology assessment groups have generally not been staffed to
generate new and scientifically valid data on a quick-reaction basis.
Instead, the staffing level of data-gathering groups and governmental
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agencies allows them only to operate at a snail's pace, and they are
burdened with delaying review procedures. When technology assessment
becomes a more leisurely process, the delays will be less serious than
they are today.
It is by no means clear that data-gathering agencies must operate
at the traditional slow pace. For instance, commercially oriented
survey organizations (the public opinion polls) collect scientifically
valid information on newly arisen public issues in relatively short
periods of time. So far, there is no tradition of expedited data
gathering to serve the purposes of technology assessment.
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III. ESTABLISHING THE EXISTENCE OF SIGNIFICANT
SECOND-ORDER RELATIONSHIPS
The Problem
One of the principal strategic problems of technology assessment
is discovering some means by which second-order effects can be identi-
fied. It is hardly possible to initiate an analysis of an effect which
is not suspected. With respect to a proposed program or activity, the
organization that has established the program as the preferred means
for accomplishing its sought-for goal (the first-order effect) will
probably be aware of some second-order effects. It may, indeed, decline
to identify these for a technology assessment group if it suspects that
the result of the analysis will inhibit it in securing approval for or
implementing its primary program, but it is likely to identify some.
Others will occur quickly to the technology assessment group or will
be called to its attention by interested parties.
However, these means of effect identification are rather hit and
miss. What is needed is a systematic approach to identifying the full
range of second-order effects. Once this is done, the follow-on program
is one of analysis, but it is by no means true that depth analysis is
justified for every imagined or suspected effect. Many suggested
second-order effects will be spurious, or inconsequential by any criteria.
For effective use of analytical resources these must be screened quickly.
The process of screening is itself an analytical effort of markedly
different character than analysis in depth. In screening analysis, the
emphasis is on economy and speed of effort—on the application of pass-
reject criteria, from which the passing items move on to analysis in
greater depth.
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Organization for Screening Analysis
The critical points in these preliminary stages are coverage and
efficiency. To obtain completeness of coverage, a technology assess-
ment group responsible for preliminary screening should function as a
wide open receptor. It will receive a great deal of debris, but no
matter, since the function of screening analysis will be to filter out
the debris before much time or effort is spent on it.
At this stage, there must be an active search for ideas. Efforts
should be made to stimulate ideas by presentations, raising of issues
and problems among types of persons who had not thought about the
matter before. The depth of such presentations should be tailored to
the character of the persons involved; it can be shallow for those who
are not prepared to think more than casually about a problem area, and
deeper for those who are better informed.
Every idea or suggestion should be recorded, summarized, categorized
and entered into the system, to remain there until disposed of. There
will be enormous redundancy in ideas obtained in this way, but with an
efficient information processing system, this need not be a problem.
A classification system, applied to each separate input, will often
identify it as identical to an input previously received, and in these
cases there would be no increase in the total number of ideas. As the
cumulative number of inputs increased, the frequency with which new
ideas were received would decrease, so that the total number of different
ideas would tend to level off as a function of the total number of inputs
received.
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A preliminary screening analysis is needed, conceptually, for every
idea—that is for every cell in an idea classification scheme applied to
inputs which is not an empty box. The.total necessary number; of screening
analyses therefore tends to approach some upper limit asymptotically.
Efficiency in the screening analysis function is obtained through
the multiple use of the analyses themselves. The first time an idea is
received;and classified according to certain characteristics, the screen-
ing analysis would be performed. On receipt of another idea in the same
cell, it would not be performed again. Only a portion of cells would
contain ideas that would be passed on for analysis in depth.
Undoubtedly many short cuts can be developed that will permit
economies of effort in screening analyses. As an example, the Patent
Office has, for decades, infuriated a certain type of inventor by refusing
to issue patents for perpetual motion machines. Its position is that
physical laws make such machines impossible, and that any "inventor" who
claims to have reduced a perpetual motion idea to practice cannot, on
prima facie evidence, have done so. So far, the Patent Office has not
been shown to be wrong, and its policy permits it to reject certain
applications very quickly and with minimal analysis. There are always
dangers in screening criteria. They must be continually reexamined and
rejustified.
Further, many screening analyses will share elements with each
other; obviously a routine step in development of a new screening
analysis would be to search for useable elements in available analyses.
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Revision and updating of screening analyses must be one of the
continuing activities of a technology assessment group. The basis
for the pass-reject decision should be subject to periodic scrutiny,
preferably from new points of view; this process would be abetted by
turnover among the persons doing the screening.
The above comments suggest that the historical development of
a technology assessment function would be as follows. Initially, a
large backlog of ideas would be built up, beyond the capability of
a technology assessment group to deal with them quickly. Priority
for analysis would be established, and the backlog would gradually
be whittled down until a screening analysis was available for every
possible idea. As the backlog was reduced, it would be found desir-
able to redo some of the screening analyses, and the workload would
shift frr>m a predominance of initial screening analyses to refinement
of elements in the file of screening analyses. It is not likely that
the total flow of ideas would decrease very quickly, but an increasing
portion of them could be disposed of through quick referral to an
existing analysis.
This concept is probably oversimplified in many ways. For example,
there are probably cycles in the rate at which inputs will be received.
As an agency effectively handles inputs, an increasing level of general
public satisfaction with the effectiveness of technology assessment
will tend to reduce the flow. Episodes, at irregular intervals,-will
temporarily increase the flow. However, a popularizationoof old
material—which happens periodically—will not increase the needed file
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of analyses but only the volume of inputs processed by referral to
existing analyses. Occasionally something fundamentally new may emerge,
followed in due course by an increase in the number of preliminary
analyses.
Analysis in Depth
Preliminary screening is merely the initiation of the technology
assessment function; there is no real accomplishment until the ideas
which pass the screening have been considered in depth. Depth analysis
would be analogous to the systems approach, and would include problem
identification, creation of a general model of the relevant situation,
identification of the needed inputs, definition of subtasks by speci-
fying the relevant inputs and outputs of each, and the nature of the
necessary integration, together with an evaluation of the importance, the
priority that that agency might give, the appropriate time frame and
level of effort. The structure for analysis outlined in Part I and II
of this paper suggests how analysis in depth might proceed.
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IV. ASSESSMENT AND THE UNCERTAIN CONSEQUENCES
OF TECHNOLOGY
The Inherent Uncertainty of Second-Order Consequences
Forecasting miscalculations are common even where techniques are
ostensibly well developed, applications straightforward, and the event
forecasted easily defined. For example highway engineers routinely
forecast traffic volume when widening highways, yet their errors are
notorious. The history of business is replete with faulty expectations,
and indeed the dispersion of business foresight is held by some econo-
mists to be essential to the operation of a free-enterprise economy. °
Men hold unreasonable expectations for forecasting. Many approach
forecasting as if future events flowed precisely in a cause-and-effeet
relationship from present conditions. However, many kinds of events are
inherently stochastic—just as there is a 50:50 probability of heads or
tails. There is no way of predicting any toss of a coin with greater
(or less) than a 50% chance of being right.
The inherent limitations in forecasting where processes are stoch-
astic is part of the dilemma of technology assessment. Where outcomes
are stochastic the possible outcomes and the probability distribution
of the whole array of possible outcomes must both be forecasted. The
distribution of outcomes is often conditional on the actions of
government, and the task of technology assessment is to establish
separate distributions for each alternative policy. Most relationships
are a combination of precise determinism and a stochastic element as is
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so cogently expressed by regression equations with an error term
appended. The magnitude of the error term depends jointly on the
completeness with which the model specifies the real relationship,
and the inherent randomness in the relationship; only the first part
can be reduced through more sophisticated modelling—and then only if
data are adequate.
Decision Theory and Technology Assessment
It may be that often there is no possible way to know in advance
what the adverse second-order consequences of a change in technology
will be. However, the basic premise of technology assessment is that
an intelligent judgment can be made as to whether or not to implement
a new technology. Through the use of decision theory, it is not
necessary that the effects be identified precisely, if the spectrum of
12possible effects can be.
Technology assessment will clearly always operate in an atmosphere
of uncertainty. The science of making decisions under conditions of
uncertainty has advanced rapidly in the past few decades to the point
where some instruction in it is a standard requirement for students of
business and management. The content of decision-theoretical models
is widely known, and the following simplified illustration serves
principally to put the strategy of a decison-theoretical technology
assessment methodology in context.
In order to apply decision theory it is necessary to: 1) enumerate
and identify the possible courses of action that an agency might take
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(including no action) and 2) enumerate and identify the possible conse-
quences of each course of action. By cross-classifying the two, a matrix
of all possible consequences of all possible courses of action is created.
An additional step is to estimate the value received for each of
the cells in the matrix. While this is easy where only a single dimension
of the consequences is relevant (e.g. profit in a business firm) it is
increasingly difficult where there are many relevant dimensions of each
consequence, not reducible to a common denominator; the difficulties are
widely understood and are the subject of considerable literature. Conse-
quences can be expressed in physical or "welfare" terms—the latter depen-
ding on an ability to relate physical effects to welfare.
A third step is assigning probabilities for each consequence; since
the model deals with what has not yet happened, these probabilities must
be derived from the best available judgment. The fourth step is to deter-
mine the costs associated with each course of action that the agency might
take—and each outcome that might flow from it. In public policy appli-
cations, not only costs appearing in an agency budget, but external costs
including social costs can reasonably be taken into account, and the
philosophy of technology assessment suggests that they should be.
Given these data, decision theoretical models provide a framework
for selecting among possible programs. There remains the question of
the selection of criteria—which has been discussed extensively in the
literature. For example, one criteria might be to select that course
of action for which the expected net value of the set of consequences that
13
might flow from it is maximized.
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Information Requirements for a Decision-Theoretic Approach
Whether or not a decision-making structure or some other approach
is used for a technology assessment, the kinds of information, the manner
in which information is structured and the considerations involved in
focusing analytical effort are essentially the same. The mode of
analysis does, to be sure, affect the kind of information needed, but
it is a matter of degree and not absolute qualities. In fact, nothing
precludes analysis of the information by a number of distinct methodol-
ogies, of which decision-theoretic models are only one.
Models from any source are of very little use until their para-
meters are estimated. One of the telling deficiencies of the usual
textbook presentation on decision theory is that it focuses on the
manipulation of data on costs, consequences and probabilities on the
assumption that they are at hand, ready to be plugged into a decision-
theoretical model.
The procedures for estimating parameters are distinctly different
than those for model building. The disciplinary boundary between model
development and the development of the inputs which make real-life
applications of models possible is unfortunately fairly sharp; one of
the problems that must be overcome in technology assessment is bridging
this gulf, not necessarily by transforming model builders into data
generators but by implementing an adequate appropriate coordinating
function.
In fact, generating the inputs may be a much more substantial effort.
The decision-theoretical model identifies the kinds of information that
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it is important to develop, the actual development of that information
is not part of decision theory; rather it may be engineering, econo-
metrics, sociology, psychology or something else.
The starting point for information needs is identifying the array
of consequences and programs. Initially, a matrix might reasonably make
a place for every suggested consequence and every suggested program
alternative. Given such a matrix, every cell is a distinct analytical
exercise relating program characteristics to a system-interconnected
string of consequences, and the analysis to back up a single cell in
the matrix may by itself be a very large exercise.
It is with respect to the analysis of cells at this point, that
the problems discussed in Part II are particularly relevant. The use
of a decision-theoretic model does not alter, but merely structures
the processes of analyses by defining explicit arrays of assumptions
and ground rules.
However the decision-theoretic model does have some unique require-
ments. Consider the most difficult area—that of the benefits and
disbenefits associated with various activities and programs. Their
multidimensionality is the heart of the problem; it is necessary that
comparisons be made of benefits conferred on different members of society,
as well as comparing different kinds of benefits.
It is because of this multidimensionality that a two-dimensional
decision theoretical matrix will not serve; clearly there will be
analyses for which it will not be appropriate to reduce all consequences
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to a single numerical value, and where the analysis must be conducted
in terms of several dimensions of consequences, as well as several
dimensions of program characteristics. The two dimensional model
merely illustrates an underlying principle which can guide preliminary
technology assessment. Any economist will recognize in this set of
concerns the central—and largely unsolved—issues of welfare economics.
Somewhat paradoxically, the best use of the resources of a prelim-
inary screening group suggests minor attention to two classes of cells—
those that are clearly very unimportant and those which are clearly
very important. With regard to the second, some cells will require
intensive analyses which go beyond the resources available to any such
assessment group. Where the costs and benefits associated with the
cell are clearly of major importance, the problem should be referred
quickly to management with the recommendation that it implement a major
study. Thus, a preliminary screening group would focus its resources
in a middle ground—on those cells where it is not clear that they
are neither very important nor inconsequential.
An integral and developed part of decision theory is to calculate
the value of information, and through comparing it with the cost to
determine the net benefit of acquiring the information. In general,
there are some cells in the matrix where the contribution of high
accuracy information to decision making is not important. Thus, in
marshalling analytical resources, perfunctory analyses will often serve
nearly as well as elaborate ones, and analytical capability can thus be
concentrated on the cells where the payoff from information is greatest.
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V. CONCLUSION
Technology Assessment in Analytical Context
It is clear that technology assessment—even a preliminary tech-
nology assessment—means balancing the desirable against the undesirable.
The Council of Economic Advisers to the President says "while it might
be tempting to say that no one should be allowed to do any polluting,
such a ban would require the cessation of virtually all economic
activity." It is characteristic of much of the concern over second-
order effects that many proponents look only at adverse consequences of
programs without balancing these against the desirable results. Clearly,
this balance must be struck in every administrative decision, and to do
this requires integrating not only information on second-order conse-
quences, but also the desirable consequences which are the primary
purpose of the program.
Technology assessment cannot reasonably be considered to be the
whole analytical scope of program analysis. There is, therefore, a
need to integrate the results of technology assessment with other
program analyses. The essential consideration is that the results of
technology assessment be supplied in a form that permits integration
with other information.
There is a need for consistency of definitions and classification
schemes. It is the usual practice in cost-benefit analysis to discount
future costs and returns. Official guidelines prescribe the discounting
rates. Cross-the-board consistency in program analysis depends on
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uniformity of the rates so that if technology assessments use discounting,
it should use the rates currently in use for related program analyses.
In aerospace-type systems analysis, establishing the compatibility of
analyses is one of the functions of systems engineering—a coordinating
role.
Some part of the notorious difficulty of successful interdisciplinary
research results from the incompatibility of data outputs from various
disciplines, as they are normally produced. Only in a few instances
and for some disciplines have successful bridges been built. For
example, certain elements of the behavioral sciences are now fairly
well integrated into the work of some economists, though others resist
the integration bitterly. In a classic article, Hollis Chenery showed
how the results of an engineering analysis, expressed in the format
traditional to engineers, could be transformed into the format useful
to economists. Dorothy Rice has, in a well-known study, transformed
life expectancy data into a form useful in economics and cost benefit
analysis. Technology assessment must be interdisciplinary, and the
integratability of analysis is crucial. Interdisciplinariness in
research does not mean merely a willingness to listen and respect each
other. The results of analyses tend to be data, and an interdisciplinary
analysis must meld—and not merely report on alternate pages—results
from a number of disciplines.
Can Technology Assessment Produce Results?
For technology assessment to be worthwhile, the decisions and follow-
on actions of governments and other organizations must somehow be different
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than they would have been otherwise. It is instructive to examine the
impact of planning studies, which are markedly akin to technology assess-
ment—indeed, it is possible to consider that technology assessment
amounts to a broadening of the focus of planning.
The frequency with which planning studies have been ignored by
decision makers is notorious. Although the quality and content of the
studies is sometimes at fault, it would appear that the most common
difficulties lie in the relationship between the planning body and the
decision makers. Planners often fail to include plans for implementa-
tion. Indeed, planners who perceive their role as technicians severely
limit their willingness to deal with and make explicit recommendations
for implementation.
These same considerations are bound to affect the degree to which
technology assessments affect public decision processes, although it is
presently difficult to see the technology assessment specialist as a
policy-neutral technician. While some—and perhaps considerable—lack
of consideration and utilization of technology assessment must be
expected, every effort should be made to minimize it, if only to increase
through utilization the efficiency of the analytical effort of technology
assessment. Efficient use of analytical resources is certainly a worthy
objective; everyone would agree that it can be enhanced by the efficient
organization and implementation of studies, but unless final reports are
to be the end products, applying the criteria of report quality to a
planning effort is a suboptimization; a more meaningful criteria is
obtained by comparing benefits to society that flow from decisions with
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the study and without it. In these terms, a mediocre study by profes-
sional criteria may actually be superior to glittering gems of analysis,
undecipherable to nonprofessionals.
As to the means by which technology assessment can be efficient
in these terms, there is room for considerable speculation. I would
advance a few propositions:
• technology assessment will have more impact when the analysis
is competent.
• it will have more impact when it conforms to the values and
philosophies of decision makers.
• it will have more impact if its results are communicated to
decision makers before they become committed to specific programs.
• it will be more acceptable when it is relevant to the high-
priority decisions which are the immediate responsibility of the
decision makers.
• it will have more impact if it does not threaten the power
or prestige of the decision makers.
• it will have more impact if it presents alternatives rather
than calling for or demanding one rigid course of action.
The last point is particularly debatable, since it runs counter to a
highly popular strategy—namely the presentation of a single program
as the only possible course of action, around which all available sup-
port can be marshalled; presenting alternatives may dissipate support
for any action at all, and indeed is a common tactic of opponents
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of any action. But the function of technology assessment is not advocacy,
but to give decision makers a larger and better hand from which they can
select their trump cards".
Implementation in the public sector as a political process is often
left out of planning. The implementers, as elected officials, are
oriented toward widely varied emphases, systems of values, and reflect
different balances of community interests. In a typical public deci-
sion-making body a large number of points of view are involved, and the
resulting decisons are typically a compromise. There is, therefore,
rarely a single cohesive set of value judgments, preferences and
community interests which can serve as a starting point for the planning
process.
Technology assessment is an exercise in value judgment as well as
in the development of hard factual information. Second-order consequences
may be the hard information part, although the fact that a program will
rouse opposition because it runs counter to the value judgments of some
part of the community is hardly irrelevant in the planning of mission-
oriented agencies.
It is on this point that the mission-oriented governmental agency
is confronted with one of the dilemmas of the American political process.
There is still considerable adherence to the doctrine that value judg-
ments are the prerogative of Congress and that the bureaucracy implements
programs consistent with those judgments. Agencies hesitate to estab-
lish identifiable, wholly effective capabilities for selecting and
implementing their own value judgments.
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If analysis had nothing to contribute to the formulation and imple-
mentation of value judgment, this would not be serious—but it has.
Persons in agencies concerned with value judgments rarely have much
analytical support for this part of their function. The process is an
under-wraps activity of top administrators and political appointees whose
status gives them a special basis for the exercise of value judgments.
Perhaps their most available forums are coequals from other agencies,
although performance may be seriously handicapped by interagency rivalries.
The points made above suggest that no single technology assess-
ment is likely to be satisfactory to the entire structure of decision
makers. Public decision making is structured; within the executive
branch there is a hierarchy of task and mission-oriented agencies which
differ in their prescribed area of activity. Offices lower in the
hierarchy generally have restricted areas of operation and mission.
The principal thrust of their effort must inevitably be on carrying
forward the program which is their principal assigned responsibility.
Performance will be judged in those terms.
In short, technology assessment directed to mission-oriented agencies
must be restricted to the scope of agency interest and responsibility;
otherwise it loses relevance to that agency. But, from a public point
of view, assessment in these terms is too narrow. A management-oriented
approach to analysis means also limiting the depth of analysis to the
point where reasonable bases for management decisions have been provided.
Analysis on this basis often lacks completeness and elegance. Some
part of these faults can be remedied through technology assessments
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produced for elements of government with multi-agency points of view.
At the apex, within the executive branch, and the client for truly
broad technology assessments, is the President and the executive
office.
Taken as an entity, the Congress might be considered to be the
client for broadly oriented technology assessment, and the general
public for even broader efforts. But to view the Congress and the
public as entities is surely an error. The principal work of the
Congress is in committees, and the client in Congress for technology
assessments is not primarily the Congress as a whole, but various
committees. As their functional areas are limited so are the scope
of the technology assessments which will appear to them to be rele-
vant. There are, to be sure, Congressional committees which habitually
take broad points of view and for whom broadly oriented technology
assessments will appear to be relevant. Much the same problem would
appear to exist with respect to the public. Nonetheless, given our
political processes, the public audience for technology assessment
cannot be neglected if technology assessment is to fulfill its promise;
and the means by which the public can be reached are as yet unresolved.
The relationship between the programs and actions of governmental
agencies and the milieu in which government acts will ultimately have
much to do with- the contribution made by technology assessment. Rela-
tionships between the character of government programs and second-order
effects are often subtle. For example, prohibition of liquor, narcotics
or cigarettes tend to create black markets, to support a criminal
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element which in turn corrupts others. These effects are, quite appro-
priately considered second-order effects of any kind of prohibition.
An additional determinant is the degree to which the social needs
to which programs and sought-for first order effects are satisfied. So
long as the need is desperate and pressing, it will be difficult to con-
vince many that second-order effects need to be taken seriously.
In Summary
In summary, it is a mere platitude to note that society is ever
changing its techniques, and that the effect of the changes are far-
reaching. What is new is the effort to predict the whole structure of
change, to evaluate it, and to identify the best of the apparently-
available alternatives. It is perhaps too early to say that there is
new emphasis on implementing the results of such assessments of tech-
nology, though clearly there is a new determination to preserve what
is best in our environment.
As yet, this determination has been poorly focused, short on analy-
tical support, and uncertain as to how to make the tradeoffs among
desirable alternatives. In the emphasis on evaluating the consequences
of scientific research the proponents of technology assessment may very
well have made a sound strategic decision, but the impact of change from
other causes is often equally important and so inextricably bound up
with science that it is not really useful to restrict technology assess-
ment to the products of science.
Potentially one of the more serious shortcomings of technology
assessment may be an unawareness of important second-order relationships.
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It would seem that a far-reaching preliminary search for possible
relationships should proceed analysis in depth. Following this, the
main thrust of analysis must be problem oriented, must avoid being
discipline-bound, and must be comparable in structure to systems analysis.
System models, the framework of such analyses, typically are simplifi-
cations achieved by explicitly setting aside second-order effects, and
because these are the heart of technology assessment, a different model-
ling approach is called for.
Technology assessment must not attempt impossible precision. The
structure of the future consequences is largely stochastic, meaning
that an array of possible outcomes, appended by probability estimates,
should be the sought-for result. Forecasts and predictions developed
in this way lend themselves readily to the methods of decision theory
which may well become a basic element of technology assessment.
The means by which technology assessment can be integrated into
decision making are still unresolved, and crucial. Let us hope that
there will be no repetition of the experience of planning, in which the
results of analysis have so often been ignored.
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This paper analyzes the implications of certain doctrines and
theories of tort liability for technology assessment and for
the tort theories and doctrines.
Kidd, Dr. Charles V. (Director, Council on Federal Relations, The
Association of American Universities.) "Technology Assessment
in the Executive Office of the President." Paper prepared for
Technology Assessment Seminar, Program of Policy Studies
in Science and Technology, The George Washington University,
December 11, 1969, Mimeo, 19 pages.
A discussion of the technology assessment function in the
Executive branch with special consideration of the ability of
the broadly defined Office of Science and Technology to
effectively carry out assessment activities. Special issue
oriented mechanisms, such as the Environmental Quality Council
are seen as possible alternatives.
Kiefer, David M. "Technology Assessment: Approach with Caution."
Chemical and Engineering News. October 20, 1969, page 26.
This article, written by a businessman'for businessmen,
criticizes some of the present efforts to develop a technology
assessment capacity in the federal government. It warns about
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the dangers of federal regulation over commercial technologi-
cal innovation.
Kiefer, David M. "Technology Assessment." Chemical and Engineering
News, October 5, 1970, pages 42-56.
This is an excellent review of the history on the present
state-of-the-art in technology assessment.
Kranzberg, Melvin. "Historical Aspects of Technology Assessment."
Program of Policy Studies in Science and Technology, The
George Washington University, Washington, D.C., Occasional
Paper No. 4. August 1969, 21 pages.
This paper traces technology assessment from the crude
trial and error procedures used by primitive man to the
increasingly more elaborate methods employed by today's
society.
Mayo, Louis H. "The Technology Assessment Function." Internal Refer-
ence Document. 3 parts. Program of Policy Studies in Science
and Technology, The George Washington University, July 1968,
Part I: The Emerging Interest in Technology Assessment;
Part II: Illustrative cases of the assessment of technologi-
cal applications; Part III: The functions and organization
of a technology assessment board.
Mayo, Louis H. "The Relationship of Technology Assessment to Environ-
mental Management." Staff Discussion Paper 206, Program of Policy
Studies in Science and Technology, The George Washington Univer-
sity, Washington, D.C., October 1969, 34 pages.
This paper stresses the need for "total technological and social
impact assessments of technological applications."
Mayo, Louis H. "Scientific Method, Adversarial System and Technology
Assessment." Revision of paper presented at the Engineering
Foundation Research Conference, Andover, New Hampshire, August
1969. Program of Policy Studies in Science and Technology, The
George Washington University, August 1969, 99 pages.
An extended discussion of the conceptual basis of technology
assessment and the relationship of an adversary process to it.
Mayo, Louis H. "Some Legal, Jurisdictional, and Operational Implica-
tions of a Congressional Technology Assessment Component."
A statement before the Subcommittee on Science, Research, and
Development, Committee on Science and Astronautics, U.S. House
of Representatives, December 2, 1969. Staff Discussion Paper
207, Program of Policy Studies in Science and Technology, The
George Washington University, Washington, D.C., 56 pages.
This paper examines briefly, through the means of a hypotheti-
cal assessment structure, certain operational implications of a
Congressional Assessment Component.
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I.
Myrick, Richard and Barbara S. Marx. "Some Research Approaches to
Studying the Development and Functioning of Technology Assess-
ment Control Processes." Staff Discussion Paper 200, Program
of Policy Studies in Science and Technology, The George Wash-
ington University, Washington, D.C., 30 pages.
This paper presents outlines of seven possible research studies
that might be conducted to learn more about the functioning
of technology assessment processes in American society.
National Goals Research Staff. "Technology Assessment." in Toward
Balanced Growth; Quantity with Quality. U.S. Government
Printing Office, Washington D.C., July 4, 1970.
A discussion of the role of technology assessment in promoting
the future welfare of the United States and its citizens.
Oppenheimer, Jack. "Roles of Federal Government Executive Agencies
in the Appraisal and Control of Detrimental Aspects of Science
and Technology." Program of Policy Studies in Science and
Technology, The George Washington University, September 15,
1967, 40 pages.
Portnoy, Barry M. "The Role of the Courts in Technology Assessment."
Cornell Law Review, Volume 55, pages 861-877.
This paper describes the many limitations in the judicial
system's ability to cope with new technology.
Starr, Dr. Chauncey. "Technology Assessment: What is it? What can
it do?" (Paper presented to NATO Science Committee, Brussels,
February 1970, and to OECD, Paris, February 1970), by Dr.
Chauncey Starr, Dean, School of Engineering and Applied
Science, University of California, Los Angeles, Mimeo, Feb-
ruary 5, 1970, 11 pages.
This paper includes a detailed conceptualization of the pro-
cess of technology assessment and a discussion of assessment
activities as they relate to the problem solving work carried
on by the legislative and executive branches.
"Symposium — Technology Assessment." George Washington Law Review,
Volume 36, July 1968. Includes: "Technology Assessment —
A Legislative View," Emilio Q. Daddario; "The Role of Congress
in Promoting and Controlling Technological Advance, " Edmund S.
Muskie; and "Controlling the Potential Hazards of Government
Sponsored Technology," Michael Wollan.
"Symposium: The Role of Technology in Society." Technology and Cul-
ture , Volume 10, October 1969, pages 489-536. Contents: (par-
tial list). "Some General Implications of the Research of the
Harvard University Program on Technology and Society " by
E. Mesthene; "Comment: The Role of Technology in Society and
the Need for Historical perspective." by H. Dupree.
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"Technology and the Polity", Research Review No. 4, Harvard University
Program on Technology and Society, 16 Kirklarid Street, Cambridge,
Massachusetts, 02148, Summer 1969, 53 pages.
This report deals with the impact of technological change on
• the American Political structure.
"Technology and Values." Research Review No. 3, Harvard University
Program on Technology and Society, Cambridge Massachusetts,
Spring 1969, 55 pages.
This paper includes a brief state-of-the-art essay on the inter-
action between technology and values and abstracts of a small
number of selected books and articles.
U.S. Congress. House Committee on Science and Astronautics. "A
Study of Technology Assessment." Report of the Committee on
Public Engineering Policy, National Academy of Engineering.
July 1969, Washington, D.C. U.S. Government Printing Office,
1969, 208 pages.
The process of technology assessment is studied and illustrated
with three examples in this report. A tentative method is pro-
posed and then applied in the three cases. An analysis of this
process is also included.
•
U.S. Congress. House Committee on Science and Astronautics. "Science,
Technology and Public Policy During the Ninetieth Congress;
First and Second Sessions, 1967-68." Report of the Subcommittee
on Science, Research, and Development of the July 1969, 91st
Congress, first session. Washington, D.C., U.S. Government
Printing Office, 1969. 308 pages plus bibliographical appendix.
This report identifies and briefly describes highlights of
legislative and executive actions that affect public policy for
science and technology in the United States.
U.S. Congress. House Committee on Science and Astronautics. "Technology
Assessment." Statement of Emilio Q. Daddario, Chairman, Subcom-
mittee on Science, Research, and Development of the 90th Congress,
first session, Washington, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1967,
16 pages plus annotated bibliography.
This is the first and basic statement on technology assessment
made by Rep. Daddario. It includes a discussion of the need for
technology assessment, its scope, and the need for future inves-
tigations.
U.S. Congress. House Committee on Science and Astronautics. "Technology
Assessment Seminar." Proceedings before the Subcommittee on Science,
Research, and Development, September 21 and 22, 1967, 90th
Congress, first session. Washington, U.S. Government Printing
Office, 1967. 184 pages.
This is a collection of the testimony at the first seminar
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on technology assessment. Among the participants were:
Louis H. Mayo, Melvin Kranzberg, E.G. Mesthene, A. Hunter
Dupree, Alan T. Waterman, and Dael Wolfle.
U.S. Congress. House Committee on Science and Astronautics.
"Technology Assessment." Hearings before the Subcommittee
on Science, Research, and Development, November 18
and December 2,3,4,8 and 12, 1969, 91st Congress, first
session. Washington, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1970,
501 pages. Hearings held subsequent to publication of the
subcommittee's three commissioned reports on technology
assessment. Among those testifying were: Dr. W.D. McElroy,
Director, NSF: Dr. L. Quincy Mumford, Librarian of Congress;
Dr. Myron Tribus, Assistant Secretary of Commerce for
Science and Technology; Dr. Louis H. Mayo, Director, Pro-
gram of Policy Studies in Science and Technology, George
Washington University; Dr. Lee A. Dubridge, Director, Office
of Science and Technology.
U.S. Congress. House Committee on Science and Astronautics. "A
Technology Assessment System for the Executive Branch."
Report of the National Academy of Public Administration,
July 1970. Washington, U.S. Government Printing Office,
1969, 85 pages.
This report proposes that technology assessment become part
of the responsibility of federal agencies at the working
level. Like budgeting, technology assessment would be
integrated into a complete report at the department level.
But this completed assessment would not be submitted to the
Office of Management and Budget. Instead it would go to
an expanded Council on Environmental Quality which would
work in concert with the OMB.
U.S. Congress. House Committee on Science and Astronautics.
"Technical Information for Congress." Report to the Subcom-
mittee on Science, Research, and Development? prepared by the
Science Policy Research Division, Legislative Reference Service,
Library of Congress. April 25, 1969. 91st Congress, first
session. House Document No. 91-137. Washington, U.S. Govern-
ment Printing Office, 1969, 521 pages. This study examines
several technical areas and programs in which Congress was
involved, and extracts from the discussion of these cases
some of the salient aspects, needs, and mechanisms for collecting,
analyzing, and applying technical information for political
decision making.
U.S. Congress. House Committee on Science and Astronautics.
"Technology: Processes of Assessment and Choice." Report
of the National Academy of Sciences, July, 1969. Washing-
ton, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1969, 163 pages. This
study concentrates on the structuring of the technology
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assessment function within the federal government. The
panel urges the creation of a constellation of organiza-
tions, with components located strategically within both
political branches, that can create a focus and a forum
for responsible technology assessment activities through-
out government and the private sector.
U.S. Congress. Senate Committee on Government Operations.
"Establish a Select Committee on Technology and the Human
Environment." Hearings before the Subcommittee on Inter-
governmental Relations on S. Res. 78, to establish
a select Senate Committee on Technology and the Human Envi-
ronment. March 4,5, and 6, April 24, and May 7, 1969.
91st Congress, first session. Washington, U.S. Government
Printing Office, 1969, 334 pages.
This collection of testimony before the Subcommittee on a
Select Committee which would be a "central forum in the
Senate to investigate the future impact of science and
technology." Among those testifying were: R. Buchminster
Fuller; Dr. E.G. Mesthene; Dr. Louis H. Mayo; Harvey Brooks;
Herbert A. Simon; Barry Commoner; and Jerome Wiesner.
Winner, Langdon. "On Criticizing Technology." Prepared for delivery
at the 66th annual Meeting of the American Political Science
Association, September 8-12, 1970.
Dr. Winner suggests that technology assessment may not go
"far enough" in its critique of technology. He suggests
some considerations that have been overlooked by the tech-
nology assessors.
Wolf, Harry, editor. "Effects of Technological Development."
Executive Seminar Center, Berkeley, California, Mimeo, 1970,
191 pages.
This includes items by C.P. Snow; Jerome D. Frank; Charles
W. Sherwin; Avery Leiserson; and J. Herbert Hollomon.
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